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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for information sharing
27 results foundAuthor: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress Summary: The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Two of the efforts undertaken since 2001 to tackle these issues included • Congress mandating the creation of an information-sharing environment (commonly known as the “ISE”) that would provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. • States and major urban areas establishing intelligence fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism intelligence and analysis. The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities. Third, “[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.” Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States. The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is an effort to have most federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, and analyzing terrorism-related SARs. The NSI is designed to respond to the mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), for a “decentralized, distributed, and coordinated [information sharing] environment ... with ‘applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.’” This report describes the NSI, the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R40901: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Shelf Number: 123560 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceFusion CentersInformation SharingTerrorism |
Author: The Constitution Project Title: Recommendations for Fusion Centers: Preserving Privacy & Civil Liberties while Protecting Against Crime & Terrorism Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and state governments embarked on a far-ranging effort to detect and defend against potential terrorist threats. One of the central components of this effort has been the creation of a network of state and regionally-based fusion centers that share information among law enforcement and some intelligence agencies. Today at least 77 fusion centers are active in the United States. While these state entities have received substantial support from Congress and the Executive Branch, their roles and missions vary widely and are still being developed. Run properly, fusion centers could play an important role in addressing terrorist and other criminal threats. Yet fusion centers can also pose serious risks to civil liberties, including rights of free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, racial and religious equality, privacy, and the right to be free from unnecessary government intrusion. Several fusion centers have issued bulletins that characterize a wide variety of religious and political groups as threats to national security. In some instances, state law enforcement agencies that funnel information to fusion centers have improperly monitored and infiltrated anti-war and environmental organizations. Moreover, the manner in which fusion centers amass and distribute personal information raises the concern that they are keeping files—perhaps containing information that is sensitive or concerns constitutionally protected activities—on people in the United States without proper justification. For these reasons, we, the members of The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee endorsing this report, have undertaken this examination of fusion centers, and offer a set of recommendations to assist policymakers to ensure that fusion centers operate effectively while respecting civil liberties and constitutional values. Part II of this report provides an overview of the structure of fusion centers and the institutional framework within which they operate. Parts III, IV and V identify specific concerns raised by fusion center data collection, data storage and use, and accountability and governance mechanisms. Part VI outlines our specific recommendations for reforms that address civil liberties concerns. We hope that these recommendations will facilitate the development of sound rules and best practices to ensure respect for constitutional rights and values. Indeed, fusion centers themselves seek concrete guidance on the practical application of constitutional principles to daily threat assessment. We also hope that they will encourage further consideration of the proper role and mission of fusion centers within the nation’s law enforcement and anti-terrorism framework. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2012 at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Shelf Number: 126403 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCriminal IntelligenceFusion CentersInformation SharingPrivacyTerrorism |
Author: Ray, Kathryn Title: Perceptions of the Policing and Crime Mapping 'Trailblazers' Summary: The aim of the research was to examine public perceptions of ‘Trailblazer’ initiatives across seven areas. These initiatives aim to increase transparency in policing and criminal justice, through enhancing or building on the national www.police.uk website. Qualitative research collected data from telephone interviews with policymakers and practitioners involved in the development and implementation of the initiatives, and from focus groups with members of the public. This enabled a detailed exploration of views, to provide feedback to the Home Office and local sites, and to inform future developments on transparency. The findings suggest a number of implications for future policy in this area. There is a need to think carefully about future enhancements to www.police.uk and related initiatives. The findings suggest that more information is not always desirable and can be counter-productive. Information needs to be high quality, relevant, usable and intelligible. The type of enhancements that should be made to www.police.uk depend upon the purposes for which the site is to be used: - to aid in crime prevention, enhancements could include more frequent updates and more details about individual crimes; for the public to use the site for holding the police to account, more aggregated data are required, namely trend data and comparisons of crime rates across areas. The findings suggest that information provision alone is unlikely to stimulate greater public engagement in police accountability, without wider activity to educate members of the public on how they might use the information to do this effectively. The initiatives need a 'hook' to keep people returning to them. Encouraging users to create an account and sign up for alerts, tailored to individual location and interest, would be useful for maintaining engagement. Details: London: Home Office, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 67: Accessed October 11, 2012 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/police-research/horr67/horr67-report?view=Binary Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/police-research/horr67/horr67-report?view=Binary Shelf Number: 126683 Keywords: Information SharingInformation SystemsPolice-Community RelationsPolicing (U.K.) |
Author: Kreyling, S.J. Title: Technology and Research Requirements for Combating Human Trafficking: Enhancing Communication, Analysis, Reporting, and Information Sharing Summary: The U.S. Department of Energy’s Science & Technology Directorate directed PNNL to conduct an exploratory study on the domain of human trafficking in the Pacific Northwest in order to examine and identify technology and research requirements for enhancing communication, analysis, reporting, and information sharing – activities that directly support efforts to track, identify, deter, and prosecute human trafficking – including identification of potential national threats from smuggling and trafficking networks. This effort was conducted under the Knowledge Management Technologies Portfolio as part of the Integrated Federal, State, and Local/Regional Information Sharing (RISC) and Collaboration Program. The major recommendations of this report are: • Defensible methodologies are needed to estimate the number of victims of human trafficking, both nationally and regionally. Various modeling and expert elicitation techniques can be applied, using the members of each DOJ anti-trafficking task force as the pool of experts, including victim service providers. Separately, there is a need to harmonize and standardize the existing efforts to estimate the scale of human trafficking in the US. • Variations in the definitions of human trafficking employed by law enforcement, service providers, and others pose a significant challenge to accurate measurement. Develop and implement a methodology that helps practitioners clarify and describe their conceptual frameworks/mental models. • Further identification of information-sharing processes and technologies currently in use by both DHS component agencies and partner organizations that participate in each of the federally-funded Anti-Human-Trafficking Task Forces across the county is required. • Research is needed on the applicability of collecting victim data from a wide variety of sources beyond law enforcement, the outreach strategies necessary to increase the breadth of sources from which information is collected, the reduction of the methodological challenges as more data is collected from different sources, and methods for using this data for the regional examination of patterns and trends. • The information collected about human trafficking investigations by local, regional and federal law enforcement is not easily accessible by investigating agents and data is not efficiently compared between agencies or across systems. Identify an emerging industry standard for federated search and begin to move existing and new systems to support it. • Ad-hoc information sharing between investigating officers/agents in different agencies is difficult and not a routine occurrence. Given the difficulties of browsing and searching the systems of other agencies, research is needed into tools that can be accessed and edited by any vetted law enforcement officer, yet with fixed geographic and categorical sections to focus on their specific interests (human trafficking, Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC), gangs, narcotics, etc.). • Despite significantly increased attention to human trafficking, Washington State has not seen an increase in identifiable and prosecutable human trafficking-related cases associated with forced labor and domestic servitude of foreign nationals. An analysis based on analyzing visa applications (e.g., B1, H2A, H2B) should be conducted to produce a “proactive triage” of potential victims from high-risk populations. • Despite significantly increased attention to human trafficking nationwide, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has not seen a comparable increase human trafficking related criminal convictions - only 30% of human trafficking cases that ICE initiated in FY09 eventually led to a criminal conviction. A lessons-learned study should be conducted to identify the factors that are most influential to a case’s successful transition from investigation to a conviction. • An International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Working Group should be convened that builds on IACP’s pre-existing work related to combating human trafficking with a specific focus on the application of technology for training and investigations from the user perspective. Lessons learned, best practices and tools or technologies needed by local law enforcement will be the expected knowledge-product outcomes. • There is large body of knowledge and perspective on trafficking and smuggling residing in the Intelligence Community (IC) which is not widely available within law enforcement. Research should be conducted on lessons learned from the intelligence community concerning human trafficking and related networks (terrorism, smuggling, narcotics, weapons, etc.) which can then be applied to law enforcement and presented in an unclassified report. • There is no systematic means of proactively assessing the scale, movement, demand, inter-connectedness, or general operation of juvenile prostitution and Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking (DMST) at a regional or larger level. A pilot sensor platform should be built to examine a significant subset of on-line prostitution sites in a regional set of participating urban areas, as well as, street-based prostitution associated with DMST. • The greatest and most immediate need that the Co-Chairs of WashACT (Seattle Police, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington, ICE, and the Washington Anti-trafficking Response Network) identified was for more shelters with specialized services for victims. In order to successfully investigate and prosecute traffickers, victims must be stable and free from fear and intimidation to be effective witnesses. • There is also a lack of capacity to deal with large numbers of trafficking victims at once, should the need arise (i.e., there is no “surge capacity”). Details: Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2011. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: PNNL-20258: Accessed December 1, 2012 at: http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-20258.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-20258.pdf Shelf Number: 127088 Keywords: Human Sexual ExploitationHuman SmugglingHuman Trafficking (Washington State, U.S.)Information SharingInter-Agency CollaborationTechnology |
Author: Gordon, John, IV Title: Keeping Law Enforcement Connected: Information Technology Needs from State and Local Agencies Summary: In an effort to assess criminal justice technology needs at the state and local levels, we conducted more than 25 individual and group interviews with criminal justice and law enforcement personnel to arrive at a better understanding of their technology priorities. We also examined the means by which these agencies commonly receive information on technology, including knowledge dissemination at the state and local levels from the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC). The technical report outlines who we interviewed, what their priorities are regarding information and geospatial technologies and analytic systems, and how they are currently learning about these technologies. It concludes with recommendations to better align investments with agencies’ needs and to improve dissemination of information about how to best employ technology. As is typical for interview and focus-group studies, the analysis in this report is intended to be exploratory, surfacing agencies’ needs rather than statistically analyzing their prevalence. Nonetheless, what we heard from the agencies was strongly consistent and more than sufficient to draw preliminary conclusions. Thus, the findings in this report will be of interest to the Department of Justice (DoJ), state and local law enforcement, and technology developers supporting law enforcement. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Center on Quality Policing, 2012. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1165.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1165.pdf Shelf Number: 127193 Keywords: Information SharingLaw Enforcement (U.S.)Police AdministrationPolice Technology |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Information Sharing: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure That Efforts to Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports Are Effective Summary: In 2007, DOJ and its federal partners developed the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative to establish a capability to gather and share terrorism-related suspicious activity reports. GAO was asked to examine the initiative's progress and performance. This report addresses the extent to which (1) federal agencies have made progress in implementing the initiative, and what challenges, if any, remain; (2) the technical means used to collect and share reports overlap or duplicate each other; (3) training has met objectives and been completed; and (4) federal agencies are assessing the initiative's performance and results. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed federal officials responsible for implementing the initiative and stakeholders from seven states (chosen based on their geographic location and other factors). The interviews are not generalizable but provided insight on progress and challenges. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ implement formalized mechanisms to provide stakeholders feedback on the suspicious activity reports they submit, mitigate risks from supporting two systems to collect and share reports that may result in the FBI not receiving needed information, more fully assess if training for line officers meets their needs, and establish plans and time frames for implementing measures that assess the homeland security results the initiative has achieved. DOJ agreed with these recommendations and identified actions taken or planned to implement them. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-233: Accessed May 1, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 128579 Keywords: Fusion CentersInformation SharingTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorists |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Fusion Center Summary: This review examined the operations of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Fusion Center (OFC) and assessed its process for sharing its analytical products. The OFC is a multi-agency intelligence center that produces intelligence products in response to requests from federal investigators (requesters). The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Special Operations Division (SOD) supports the OFC in developing these products. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2014. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: I-2014-002: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/e1402.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/e1402.pdf Shelf Number: 132194 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceDrug EnforcementFusion CentersInformation SharingOrganized Crime |
Author: Hollywood, John Title: High-Priority Information Technology Needs for Law Enforcement Summary: This study reports on strategic planning activities supporting the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in the area of information technology, collecting and analyzing data on law enforcement needs and offering potential solutions through technology assessment studies, extensive outreach and liaison activities, and subject matter expert panels. Strategic planning will help NIJ make the best investments to leverage its limited funds and help the range of technology developers supporting law enforcement better understand the law enforcement community's needs and priorities. By looking across the top-ranking needs, the authors identified 11 crosscutting themes in total. These themes are further grouped into three overarching keynotes - a broad need to improve the law enforcement community's knowledge of technology and practices, a broad need to improve the sharing and use of law enforcement-relevant information, and a broad need to conduct research, development, testing, and evaluation on a range of topics. The latter category includes research on both the "non-material" side of technology, including policy and practices, and more traditional technical development. Key Findings Law Enforcement's Knowledge of IT and Its Dissemination Can Be Improved -A wide range of efforts have been undertaken to disseminate technology information to law enforcement practitioners. -A strong desire for help in technology use and management remains, implying needs for improvement in technology dissemination and education. Sharing, Displaying, and Using Information Effectively Is a Major Challenge -Enabling the sharing of information across law enforcement systems is a difficult problem - technically, organizationally, and commercially. -Information-sharing efforts to date have had limited coverage and can be inconsistent with each other. Further, it is difficult for new developers and users to learn about all of the available information-sharing tools and technologies. -Tools that display situational awareness information to law enforcement users at all levels are lacking. -In addition to sharing information within law enforcement, there is a need to improve mechanisms for communicating with the public. Additional Areas Need Research and Development -There is a need to improve systems for monitoring and protecting the health of officers, including both physical and mental health. -There is a need to improve security, privacy, and civil rights policies for using IT. -There is a need to improve the affordability of law enforcement IT systems across their entire life cycle. -There is an overarching need to identify promising practices that can leverage IT effectively to reduce crime. There is a need to improve IT, along with supporting training and policies, to help law enforcement respond to major incidents. -There is a need to improve, and improve the use of, a range of deployable sensors. These include body-worn cameras, field biometrics, electronic evidence collection systems, and video surveillance systems. Recommendations -A federal coordinator for technology-related outreach should be designated; this coordinator would work with various offices involved to develop and monitor a dissemination strategy capturing who will do what, for whom, and when. -This coordinator should maintain and monitor a master list of outstanding needs and development tasks to address them. -The coordinator should also capture which information-sharing projects are addressing the required tasks and disseminate all gathered information in an information-sharing strategic plan. -Work on providing common operational picture/dashboard displays to law enforcement officers should be undertaken. -Communications between the public and law enforcement should be improved. -The emotional state and physical health of officers should be monitored. -Federal efforts to provide tracking systems for responders during major events should be undertaken. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR737.html Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR737.html Shelf Number: 134764 Keywords: ComputersInformation SharingInformation TechnologyLaw Enforcement TechnologyPolice Education and TrainingPolice Technology (U.S.) |
Author: Nolan, Andrew Title: Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions Summary: Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks has been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national interests of the United States. While considerable debate exists with regard to the best strategies for protecting America's various cyber-systems and promoting cybersecurity, one point of general agreement amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence both within the private sector and between the private sector and the government. Nonetheless, there are many reasons why entities may opt to not participate in a cyber-information sharing scheme, including the potential liability that could result from sharing internal cyber-threat information with other private companies or the government. More broadly, the legal issues surrounding cybersecurity information sharing - whether it be with regard to sharing between two private companies or the dissemination of cyber-intelligence within the federal government - are complex and have few certain resolutions. In this vein, this report examines the various legal issues that arise with respect to the sharing of cybersecurity intelligence, with a special focus on two distinct concepts: (1) sharing of cyberinformation within the government's possession and (2) sharing of cyber-information within the possession of the private sector. With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the federal government, the legal landscape is relatively clear: ample legal authority exists for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to serve as the central repository and distributor of cyber-intelligence for the federal government. Nonetheless, the legal authorities that do exist often overlap, perhaps resulting in confusion as to which of the multiple sub-agencies within DHS or even outside of DHS should be leading efforts on the distribution of cyber-information within the government and with the public. Moreover, while the government has wide authority to disclose cyber-intelligence within its possession, that authority is not limitless and is necessarily tied to laws that restrict the government's ability to release sensitive information within its possession. With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the private sector, legal issues are clouded with uncertainty. A private entity that wishes to share cyber-intelligence with another company, an information sharing organization like an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) or an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), or the federal government may be exposed to civil or even criminal liability from a variety of different federal and state laws. Moreover, because of the uncertainty that pervades the interplay between laws of general applicability - like federal antitrust or privacy law - and their specific application to cyberintelligence sharing, it may be very difficult for any private entity to accurately assess potential liability that could arise by participating in a sharing scheme. In addition, concerns may arise with regard to how the government collects and maintains privately held cyber-intelligence, including fears that the information disclosed to the government could (1) be released through a public records request; (2) result in the forfeit of certain intellectual property rights; (3) be used against a private entity in a subsequent regulatory action; or (4) risk the privacy rights of individuals whose information may be encompassed in disclosed cyber-intelligence. The report concludes by examining the major legislative proposal - including the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), and the Cyber Threat Sharing Act (CTSA) - and the potential legal issues that such laws could prompt. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: R43941: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf Shelf Number: 135398 Keywords: Cyber SecurityCybercrime (U.S.)Information SharingIntelligence GatheringInternet Crime |
Author: European Commission. Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security Title: Study on "Best Practices in Vertical Relations between the Financial Intelligence Unit and (1) Law Enforcement Services and (2) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Reporting Entities with a View to Indicating Effective Models for Feedback on Fol" Summary: The objective of the study was to make an inventory on the provision of feedback between the Reporting Entities (REs), the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Law enforcement Authorities (LEAs). 25 Member States were visited and a large number of interviews were held. Feedback should be provided and received in the following ways: (1) Feedback should be received by the REs in reaction to the financial reports (STRs) the REs are legally obligated to send to the FIUs of the different Member States. (2) Feedback should be provided by LEAs to the FIUs in reaction on the dissemination by the FIU of financial information on the basis of the STRs received from the REs. The interviews of personnel from the REs, FIUs and LEAs indicated a level of feedback (FIU->RE) as generally recommended in the Best practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback, published in 1998 by the FATF. There are some new developments like indications on quality of STRs being fed back to the REs. The main forms of feedback between those entities (FIU->RE) are however still based on the recommendations of the FATF. Feedback in the 25 Member States consists mainly of general feedback (the organisation of AML-meetings, workshops, statistics, typologies, trends, sanitised cases etc.) and specific feedback (individual or case to case) on the outcome of specific STRs reported by the REs. This last form of feedback seems to be provided in an informal way in most Member States. Some forms of formal obligations to provide specific feedback between FIUs and LEAs and from the FIUs to REs were found in some Member States. It was also found that even if there was a formal obligation for LEAs and the FIU to provide feedback to each other and the REs, this not always meant that feedback was supplied to the REs. The general impression of the AML activities in relation to feedback within the Member States visited by the Team is that most Member States still rely on the "old" recommendations of the FATF (1998) on feedback. New ways to provide feedback are hardly developed. Good communication and information exchange with the REs is not sufficiently implemented in a lot of Member States. Contacts between reporting Entities and the FIU as well as Law enforcement authorities seem to have decreased in some Member States. "The number of meeting, conferences and training sessions have become less and less, AML information is not sent as frequently as in the past, the relation between FIUs, Reporting Entities and Law enforcement, in relation to the money laundering approach has cooled down". General Remarks like this by a number of REs seem to suggest a declining interest in AML activities. A possible explanation for this may be the lack of communication and cooperation within the AML chain (REs, FIUs and LEAs), continuous organisational changes that some institutions are facing, complicated AML legislation and lack of sufficient results in the form of ML convictions. Audits performed in some Member States on the effectiveness of AML Institutions showed few achievements in the fight against ML, and as a consequence, usually a reorganisation of the AML institutions was undertaken in some countries. Some examples of these changes are The Netherlands (2006 MOT to the FIU the Netherlands), The United Kingdom (2006 NCIS to SOCA) and presently Italy (2008). Other Member States have relocated their FIU organisation or created new functions like a police liaisons within their units, e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Estonia. In addition, FIUs and REs expressed their concern about the increasing number of tasks that have been assigned to them in relation to the traditional AML activities and or new specific tasks regarding the financing of terrorism. This report certainly does not pretend to be of a scientific nature but merely an introduction to the problem of feedback. One thing is certain, there is a lot of improvement to be made in the communication and cooperation between the different AML institutions. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2008. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136357 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationFinancial CrimesInformation SharingLaw EnforcementMoney LaunderingsOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: ICF GHK Title: Study on Possible Ways to Improve the Exchange of Information on Travelling Violent Offenders Including those Attending Sporting Events or Large Public Gatherings Summary: The aim of this assignment was to inform EU decision-making on the possible ways of improving the exchange of information between Member States on travelling violent offenders (TVO) in connection with major events, including large public gatherings and sporting events. The assignment: "Analysed and provided an overview of the types of events which have been subject to unlawful disruption by TVO crossing national frontiers;" Analysed the law enforcement authorities of needs in relation to information on TVO in connection with major events, particularly regarding content on the subjects, format and time; "Analysed the different sources of information on TVO at national and EU level;" Provided a detailed analysis and description of how information exchange on TVO has occurred across the EU, particularly through the analysis of major events; Provided a detailed identification and analysis of the reasons for unsatisfactory exchange of information related to TVO; Analysed ways of providing a definition of the term TVO at EU level and proposed at least three definitions; Examined, described and evaluated different non-IT based options in order to improve the exchange of information on TVO; and Examined, described and evaluated IT based solutions in order to improve the exchange of information on TVO. Details: Birmingham, UK: ICF GHK, 2013. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report for Directorate-General for Home Affairs: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/police-cooperation/general/docs/study_on_improving_the_info_exchange_on_travelling_violent_offenders_march_2013_en.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/police-cooperation/general/docs/study_on_improving_the_info_exchange_on_travelling_violent_offenders_march_2013_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136563 Keywords: Information SharingSporting EventsTravelling CriminalsViolent Offenders |
Author: Bigo, Didier Title: Justice and Home Affairs Databases and a Smart Borders System at EU External Borders An Evaluation of Current and Forthcoming Proposals Summary: This study examines current and forthcoming measures related to the exchange of data and information in EU Justice and Home Affairs policies, with a focus on the 'smart borders' initiative. It argues that there is no reversibility in the growing reliance on such schemes and asks whether current and forthcoming proposals are necessary and original. It outlines the main challenges raised by the proposals, including issues related to the right to data protection, but also to privacy and non-discrimination. Details: Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2012. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 52: Accessed August 25, 2015 at: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2052%20JHA%20Databases%20Smart%20Borders.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2052%20JHA%20Databases%20Smart%20Borders.pdf Shelf Number: 136574 Keywords: Border SecurityIllegal ImmigrationInformation SharingOrganized Crime |
Author: Nolan, Debbie Title: Youth Justice: A Study of Local Authority Reintegration and Transitions Practice Across Scotland Summary: This paper is the second of two research papers drawing on data from a survey of Whole System Approach leads in 27 of Scotland's 32 local authority areas. It aims to explore reintegration and transitions practice in these local authorities and to share practice examples. The key findings of this paper are: - Processes for sharing information with the SPS and secure care providers when a young person enters these establishments are well established. - Over 80% of respondents treated young people who are given a period of detention in secure care and had not previously been looked after and accommodated as a looked after and accommodated child. - 65% of participants stated 72 hour reviews were always held for young people aged under 18 entering secure care or custody by order of the court. The impact and purpose of these meetings was recognised but there were varying views about the interpretation of and who should attend, arrange, and chair these meetings, as well as numerous barriers to completing 72 hour reviews. - 71% of respondents stated the lead professional role was always maintained by the local authority where the child ordinarily resides while they are in secure care or custody. In addition, 70% of participants advised community based social work staff were always involved with the young person during this period, however the type and frequency of involvement varied. - All respondents advised post-release support was available to young people returning from a period of detention in secure care and custody and 77% reported that all young people have a throughcare or aftercare plan, with the type and frequency of support again varying. - 75% of respondents stated meet at the gate support was always provided if a young person under the age of 18 was not being met by a friend or family member. - Third sector agencies worked in over 90% of participants local authority areas, with the mean number of organisations 3.35. - Respondents were committed to young people remaining in secure accommodation following their 16th birthday (up until their 18th birthday) to serve the remainder or as much of their sentence rather than transferring to custody. The subsequent implications and recommendations for practice are: - Good information sharing between Social Work Services, SPS and secure care providers must continue and this should be monitored to assess quality and consistency. - All practitioners working with young people involved in offending behaviour should understand, be able to communicate and fulfil the rights and entitlements of looked after children and care leavers under the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014. - 72 hour reviews should be held for every young person detained in secure care or custody and this should be monitored on a local basis and by the SPS. - The lead professional role should be maintained and fully fulfilled by the local authority for all young people in secure care and custody. - Contact by community based social work staff should be maintained. - Throughcare and aftercare plans should be in place prior to release for all young people, must incorporate the identified elements of effective throughcare, and be monitored locally. - Meet at the gate support should be provided for all young people leaving secure care or custody following a period of detention. - Efforts should be made to ensure partnership working is effective and to reduce barriers to this. - More equitable arrangement should continue to be sought between SPS, the Scottish Government, local authorities and the secure estate to ensure placement decisions for young people aged under 18 are influenced primarily by need and vulnerability rather than cost. - Training and support should continue to be made available to all practitioners involved in supporting young people in the youth justice system to understand their roles and responsibilities in respect of reintegration and transitions practice. - Further research to address the limitations of this study would be beneficial. Details: Glasgow: Centre for Youth and Criminal Justice, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.cycj.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Youth-Justice-A-Study-of-Local-Authority-Reintegration-and-Transitions-Practice-Across-Scotland-FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cycj.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Youth-Justice-A-Study-of-Local-Authority-Reintegration-and-Transitions-Practice-Across-Scotland-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136638 Keywords: Information SharingJuvenile Justice SystemJuvenile ReentryReintegrationYouthful Offenders |
Author: Thomas, Jennifer Title: The importance of scientific and technical innovation in the police investigation of gun crime Summary: My original contribution to knowledge is the assessment of two ballistics analysis systems using the same bullets and cartridge cases to assess interoperability potential. The results are discussed in the context of policing issues representing a multidisciplinary approach to combating gun crime. Microscopic comparison of bullets and cartridge cases allows inferences to be made that objects bear marks from the same weapon. Parts of this process have been automated. Digital images of objects are stored in a database and correlations undertaken to find potential matches. An expert will decide on the most probable match based upon a range of potential candidates. All evidence should be utilised to the fullest extent, including data from ballistics systems. The success rate of the most widely used system has been quoted at between 50% and 95% suggesting that links to other crimes remain undiscovered. There are different ballistics systems available but research has only been conducted on one. There is no interoperability between systems. Data cannot be shared between different systems. An essential pre-requisite to any work on interoperability, is an understanding of the different systems and the data produced. The research aims were to design a methodology to enable the assessment of systems and to produce ammunition that can be used repeatedly as required. The aim was to conduct an experiment with two of the currently available systems. The results show variance between systems and their accuracy needs improvement. An error rate has been defined and applied to each system. The results suggest that complete interoperability of systems will only be possible with the full cooperation of the manufacturers. A limited form of interoperability focussing on data sharing may be possible. The results have implications for experts using the systems and suggest that a matching standard should be developed to make forensic ballistics analysis an objective discipline. Details: Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield, 2011. 229p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/12940/ Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/12940/ Shelf Number: 136693 Keywords: Criminal Investigation Firearms and Crime Forensic Ballistics Gun-Related Violence Information Sharing |
Author: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title: Access to Information, Violence against Women, and the Administration of Justice in the Americas Summary: The report aims to provide an introduction to the challenges faced by women in the Americas in gaining adequate access to State-controlled information on violence and discrimination. It also seeks to systematize the international standards that have been developed in the inter-American system on this subject, and to identify good practices in the region with regard to the application of and compliance with those standards. The right of access to information is closely related to the exercise of other human rights, and in that sense, the failure to comply with the obligations of respecting and guaranteeing women's free access to information can be understood to lead to various violations of their rights to live free from violence and discrimination. The IACHR has observed that even in States with institutionalized mechanisms for gathering, processing, and producing information on violence against women, often that information is not adequately disseminated. Likewise, the IACHR has noted that there is a widespread lack of coordination in the region between the various systems that coexist in the States for gathering and producing information, for example records kept by free legal aid offices, data collected by observatories on violence or discrimination, and mechanisms for compiling judicial statistics. With regard to the main challenges in access to public information on discrimination and violence, the IACHR has reported on a number of occasions that there are deficiencies in the availability, quality, and completeness of public information on violence and discrimination against women. These include the failure to gather complete information in the various State bodies on all the different types of violence and discrimination, as well as the failure to produce comprehensive statistics based on that information and to disaggregate the statistical information by factors such as sex, race, ethnicity, age, social status, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, and other criteria that would make it possible to appreciate the true incidence of violence and discrimination in specific groups of women. The importance of compiling data and producing statistics has been highlighted in the inter-American and the United Nations human rights systems as a fundamental mechanism for designing and evaluating public polices and prevention, assistance, and protection programs on violence and discrimination. Another priority challenge involves the effective implementation of international standards on access to information in the domestic sphere. In this regard, the IACHR has stated that although the vast majority of countries in the region have constitutional and/or legal regulations in place on this matter, concrete information about the practical implementation and effectiveness of those regulations is not available, which makes it difficult to evaluate the level of compliance with State obligations. Access to information in the realm of the administration of justice is an area of special interest for the IACHR. It presents a number of challenges in terms of guaranteeing access to information as a right that facilitates access to justice for women victims of violence and discrimination. In this context, the IACHR notes that the following are priority challenges: ensuring access by women and their family members to information on their pending violence or discrimination cases; the availability of appropriate and sufficient free legal aid services; and access to interpreters and information in other languages for women who do not speak the official State language, among other challenges. The IACHR underscores the importance of having public information on justice system operations, including data on the number of arrests, prosecutions, convictions, restraining orders, and judgments handed down; the amount of time it takes to decide cases; the gender makeup of the justice systems; the budgets allocated to judicial activities; and the internal accountability mechanisms. The Commission urges the Member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) to adopt measures to guarantee the availability of high-quality free legal aid services, the training of justice operators and other public employees who are involved with violence-related issues, and the implementation of action protocols for cases in which violence is imminent. The Commission also reiterates its willingness to work with the States in their efforts in this sphere of protection which is so essential for women to be able to fully exercise their rights. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2015. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Access-information.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South America URL: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Access-information.pdf Shelf Number: 137363 Keywords: DiscriminationDomestic ViolenceGender-Related ViolenceInformation SharingViolence Against WomenViolence Against Women, Prevention |
Author: Sondergaard, Susanne Title: TACTICS: Policy and strategic impacts, implications and recommendations Summary: In recent years the threat of terrorism in urban environments has become an important issue, emphasised by several successfully carried out terrorist attacks (New York, Madrid, London, Copenhagen and Paris are just some examples). When security forces are alerted to a specific terrorist threat, their main goal is to prevent an actual attack. On the other hand, if prevention fails and the attack is carried out, independent of the degree of success, security forces become responsible for stopping it and mitigating its consequences. In both cases, the efficiency and effectiveness of the response relies on three key pillars: 1. Ability to respond quickly, without bias in decisionmaking, enabled by specific and precise requests for information and clearly issued orders. 2. Ability to decompose threats into observable terrorist behaviours specific for urban environments to enable an increased level of preparedness by security forces. 3. Ability to efficiently and effectively manage capabilities. TACTICS is an FP7 project commissioned by the European Commission in 2012 to develop low technology readiness level (TRL) decision support technology to assist security forces in countering terrorist threats in urban environments. The system that was developed as part of this project brings an innovative approach built around the three core capabilities described above. The acronym stands for Tactical Approach to Counter Terrorists in Cities. Conceptually, it can be defined as a counterterrorism decision support technology designed to facilitate a clearer understanding of both the threat and the capabilities available to counteract it, enabling a faster, more efficient and effective security force response. Technology has played, and will continue to play, a central role in counterterrorism policy, strategy and operations. Recent years have seen rapid innovation and the development of new technological applications, such as facial recognition and biometrics, counter-IED, communications interception, airport security, explosive and weapon detection, and so on. This report analyses eight case studies of counterterrorist technology implementation in order to extract lessons that can be applied in the context of deploying a TACTICS-like system in Europe. Furthermore, it presents a series of lessons extracted from relevant case law. There are a number of challenges that policymakers face today in the ever-increasing reliance on technology for countering terrorism in Europe today. These include: The level of engagement with the communities affected by the technology implementation; The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; The resources dedicated to counterterrorism; Achieving an appropriate balance between privacy and security; Data sharing challenges; and Respect for criteria of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Shelf Number: 138567 Keywords: Counter-terrorismInformation SharingLaw Enforcement TechnologyTerrorismUrban Security |
Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCybercrimeData ProtectionDrug TraffickingExtremist GroupsInformation SharingMoney LaunderingPartnershipsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains: Opportunities May Exist to Share Information More Efficiently Summary: Every year, more than 600,000 people are reported missing, and hundreds of human remains go unidentified. Two primary federal databases supported by DOJ - NCIC and NamUs - contain data related to missing and unidentified persons to help solve these cases. NCIC contains criminal justice information accessed by authorized agencies to assist with daily investigations. NamUs information can be used by law enforcement, medical examiners, coroners, and the general public to help with long-term missing and unidentified persons cases. Senate Report 113-181 (accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015) includes a provision for GAO to review NCIC and NamUs. This report describes the access to and use of missing and unidentified persons information contained in NCIC and NamUs, and the extent to which there are opportunities to improve the use of this information. GAO reviewed NCIC and NamUs data, and relevant state and federal statutes. GAO also conducted nongeneralizeable interviews with stakeholders in three states, selected in part on state laws. What GAO Recommends To allow for more efficient use of missing and unidentified persons information, GAO recommends that DOJ evaluate options to share information between NCIC and NamUs. DOJ disagreed because it believes it lacks the necessary legal authority. GAO believes DOJ can study options for sharing information within the confines of its legal framework, and therefore believes the recommendation remains valid. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-515: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677717.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677717.pdf Shelf Number: 139304 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInformation SharingMissing Persons |
Author: Connery, David Title: For the right reasons, in the right ways (Part 1): A four-nation survey of information sharing about organised crime Summary: This special report examines how government, business and the community in four nations share information about organised crime. Its key finding is that the Australian Government, businesses and community as a whole must be open to new kinds of information sharing partnerships. The report begins by defining information sharing as 'the trusted exchange of relevant knowledge or data between organisations to achieve their mutual objectives'. The types of information shared are then divided into two: case information that involves data about individuals who are usually suspected of involvement in criminal activity; and bulk data that includes people in a given set regardless of any possible connection with crime. The field work involved over 80 interviews, including visits to or discussions about a range of information sharing mechanisms in Israel, the UK, the Netherlands and the US. Those mechanisms were broadly differentiated by their location (within or outside government) and the nature of the sharing interaction (exchange or collaboration). The variety of mechanisms used in the four selected nations shows that information sharing is valued and strongly shaped by the particular national context. This means some countries rely heavily on informal systems, others have large numbers of specialised exchanges, and some are more risk accepting in their arrangements than others. The field work showed that a wide range of options for sharing information about crime exist, and Australian authorities and businesses might wish to consider a number of them in more detail. This research found both upsides and downsides to information sharing about crime. Some benefits are clear, including the opportunity to shape better interventions and build economy of effort in activities. While these upsides are undoubtedly attractive, it seems that the possible downsides of sharing - such as loss of control, the potential to compromise sensitive activities or an unwillingness to risk breaking laws, including those around privacy - were viewed as considerably strong downsides to sharing. Still, it's clear that sharing must occur. That's because the scale of the challenge posed by organised crime - and the speed, reach and depth of penetration that the internet enables - means information sharing is critical for all three groups. This report explains that information sharing is best promoted by building a strong sense of shared interest among the participants and then developing a strong system for information sharing that's governed by understood rules. This finding stands in contrast to those who emphasise interpersonal trust as the basis for sharing. Factors that work against information sharing about crime include legislative barriers and complexity, poor value propositions around sharing, the self-conceptions of the actors and what they value information for, and cultural barriers. Such barriers include a culture of secrecy in government, a lack of willingness to expose possible flaws, and the view that 'information is power'. These are perhaps the most powerful inhibitors to sharing. Efforts to enhance Australia's methods of sharing information about organised crime should be designed to cope with these inhibitors while making best use of the factors that promote this activity. Options for hosting information sharing organisations outside government, accepting a greater role for private funding for law enforcement activities, and encouragement of commercial efforts to gather and collate information, should all be considered by the Australian Government as it looks for new ways to undermine organised crime. Details: Barton ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/for-the-right-reasons,-in-the-right-ways-part-1-a-four-nation-survey-of-information-sharing-about-organised-crime/SR96_info_sharing_crime.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/for-the-right-reasons,-in-the-right-ways-part-1-a-four-nation-survey-of-information-sharing-about-organised-crime/SR96_info_sharing_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 144798 Keywords: CollaborationInformation SharingOrganized CrimePartnerships |
Author: State Coroner of New South Wales Title: Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Cafe siege: Findings and recommendations Summary: The inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Cafe siege examined the circumstances surrounding, and issues arising in relation to, the deaths of Tori Johnson, Katrina Dawson and Man Haron Monis in December 2014. The New South Wales Coroner has delivered his findings into the Lindt Cafe siege which took place in December 2014, and resulted in the deaths of three people, including the hostage-taker. The report examines the actions of the police, the interactions and exchange of information between state and federal agencies, differences between domestic sieges and terrorist sieges, hostage negotiation, use of experts such as psychiatrists and psychologists, police command and operational structures and communications system. Details: Glebe, NSW: Coroners Court of New South Wales, 2017. 495p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf Shelf Number: 145765 Keywords: Hostage NegotiationsInformation SharingPolice ProceduresTerrorism |
Author: Lacy, Diane Title: Analysis of the Criminal Justice System's Data Architecture Summary: The criminal justice system in the United States is a complex national enterprise consisting of a multitude of independent units of government (jurisdictions and agencies) that must coordinate their activities in order to achieve a common goal: an efficient and effective justice system. To effectively coordinate these activities, system stakeholders must effectively share information. However, due to its diversity and decentralization, the justice system lacks a common framework for sharing data - in other words, it lacks a common data architecture. The primary hypothesis of this project was that while the justice community has invested significantly in developing information sharing standards, which are critical components of a data architecture, it has not developed a complete "enterprise" view of the justice process that properly identifies all of the components required to understand the entire enterprise, nor has it properly scaled these exchanges to maximize their utility across organizational boundaries. The results of this research affirm this hypothesis - there is little demonstration that the justice system has developed a comprehensive enterprise model of a criminal justice data architecture. However, this research has also moved the discussion forward by developing a framework for assessing the state of the justice data architecture. Justice stakeholders can use this framework to capture, document, and measure the components that exist, and they can add to it to develop a robust criminal justice data architecture. The goals of this project were to - 1) document the current as-is state of the criminal justice system's data architecture compared to its ideal future to-be state, and identify gaps between the two, and 2) develop a common framework or structure for defining the information sharing requirements and capabilities of the criminal justice process - a data architecture metamodel and framework. To accomplish these goals, researchers defined the structure of the framework following principles of Enterprise Architecture, Service Oriented Architecture, and Business Process Modeling. Following this framework, researchers used the framework to document the as-is and to-be states of the criminal justice data architecture. Details: Sacramento, CA: SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, 2017. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250964.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250964.pdf Shelf Number: 146798 Keywords: Criminal Justice DataCriminal Justice SystemsInformation Sharing |
Author: Goodrum, Sarah Title: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting: Lessons Learned on Information Sharing, Threat Assessment, and Systems Integrity Summary: To better understand how the December 13, 2013 shooting at Arapahoe High School, in which senior Karl Pierson (hereafter, referred to as KP3 ) shot and killed Claire Davis and then himself, might be prevented, the Arapahoe High School Community Fund Honoring Claire Davis, a donor-advised fund of The Denver Foundation, approached the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder to assist with the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data obtained from an arbitration proceeding in the case. The purpose was to understand the school's threat and risk assessment procedures and responses, and the lessons that might be learned from this incident that could improve youth violence prevention in school settings in Colorado and the U.S. The data for the report came from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office's (ACSO) investigation materials, Littleton Public School's (LPS) interrogatory responses, deposition exhibits, and deposition testimony. The principal investigators attended most of the depositions and reviewed all of the documents produced by ACSO and LPS. The findings revealed three major failures within AHS and LPS in the months and years leading up to the shooting: (1) a failure of information sharing, (2) a failure of threat assessment, and (3) a failure of systems thinking. While not the focus of this report, preliminary evidence indicates that AHS staff and LPS administrators have made several changes in their approach to school safety since 2013, and those changes represent important steps in the right direction To better understand how the December 13, 2013 shooting at Arapahoe High School, in which senior Karl Pierson (hereafter, referred to as KP3 ) shot and killed Claire Davis and then himself, might be prevented, the Arapahoe High School Community Fund Honoring Claire Davis, a donor-advised fund of The Denver Foundation, approached the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder to assist with the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data obtained from an arbitration proceeding in the case. The purpose was to understand the school's threat and risk assessment procedures and responses, and the lessons that might be learned from this incident that could improve youth violence prevention in school settings in Colorado and the U.S. The data for the report came from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office's (ACSO) investigation materials, Littleton Public School's (LPS) interrogatory responses, deposition exhibits, and deposition testimony. The principal investigators attended most of the depositions and reviewed all of the documents produced by ACSO and LPS. The findings revealed three major failures within AHS and LPS in the months and years leading up to the shooting: (1) a failure of information sharing, (2) a failure of threat assessment, and (3) a failure of systems thinking. While not the focus of this report, preliminary evidence indicates that AHS staff and LPS administrators have made several changes in their approach to school safety since 2013, and those changes represent important steps in the right direction leading the school staff to believe that they would be more liable if they had shared information about KP's concerning behaviors, than if they had not. Second, the Sheriff's Report clearly states that at least ten AHS students had substantive concerns about KP's anger problems and gun ownership prior to the shooting, but only one student reported their concern to a counselor and no students reported their concerns to Safe2Tell (see ACSO Report, pp. 10-11). If just one student or teacher, had called Safe2Tell, this tragedy might have been averted. At the time of the shooting and as of July 2015, LPS and AHS administrators did not have a policy regarding Safe2Tell training and did not require that students or staff receive training on the Safe2Tell system. In fact, the information shared about Safe2Tell at AHS was limited to a sticker on the back of student identification cards, posters displayed in the school hallways, and a PowerPoint slide displayed in the cafeteria. Third, AHS and LPS failed to implement an Interagency Information Sharing Agreement to facilitate the sharing of vital information about an individual's safety concerns with law enforcement, juvenile justice, and social services agencies, which is recommended by Colorado statute (SB 00-133), the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV), and the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (see the CSSRC's Essentials of School Threat Assessment: Preventing Targeted School Violence, LPS 03421-03443). Details: Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) at the University of Colorado Boulder, 2016. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2017 at: http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/AHS-Report/Report_on_the_Arapahoe_High_School_Shooting_FINAL.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/publications/AHS-Report/Report_on_the_Arapahoe_High_School_Shooting_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 147035 Keywords: Information SharingSchool SafetySchool ShootingsSchool ViolenceThreat AssessmentViolence Prevention |
Author: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority Title: Law Enforcement Information Sharing Task Force. EDiscovery Initiative Final Report Summary: The Law Enforcement Information Sharing Task Force (Task Force) reviewed the mission set forth in PA 99-0874 and determined that the imminent technological possibilities were a priority. Moreover, while PA 99-0874 highlights the importance of studying information sharing technologies and processes for the purpose of improving the criminal discovery process, the Task Force determined that the state's role in facilitating information sharing for public safety and criminal justice agencies must go beyond criminal discovery. Illinois must advance its efforts for using technology to improve multi-jurisdictional, crossboundary, information sharing between local and state public safety agencies and criminal justice agencies. The Task Force believes that the charge set forth by PA 99-0874 could serve as an effective use case for state and local governments to collaboratively initiate the development of a comprehensive statewide information sharing environment for the public safety and criminal justice domain. However, the Task Force also agreed that it did not have the resources and or capacities to fully examine this complex issue, which would include, at a minimum, a deeper analysis of the different information systems local jurisdictions use, how the state could promote more effective information sharing practices among local jurisdictions, and the real cost and benefits of implementation. As such, the Task Force offers this report as a preliminary analysis and set of recommendations to promote more effective and efficient state and local information sharing practices and systems. Details: Chicago: ICJIA, 2007. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2018 at: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ICJIA_ILEITF_HB5613_Report_%20120117.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ICJIA_ILEITF_HB5613_Report_%20120117.pdf Shelf Number: 148888 Keywords: CollaborationInformation SharingLaw EnforcementPolice Technology |
Author: Hollywood, John Title: Addressing Emerging Trends to Support the Future of Criminal Justice: Findings of the Criminal Justice Technology Forecasting Group Summary: The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has established the Criminal Justice Technology Forecasting Group (CJTFG), an expert advisory panel that includes both practitioners and researchers to deliberate on the effects that major technology and social trends could have on criminal justice in the next three to five years and identify potential responses. This report captures the results from the CJTFG's meetings and initiatives. It presents the emerging trends and highlights of the group's discussion about them. It then presents the results of analyses to assess connections between the trends, leading to recognizing the crosscutting themes that those connections represent. In addition, the report presents analyses to generate a set of recommended ways to address the trends that the full group reviewed and approved. The CJTFG covered a wide range in topics in its deliberations, identifying close to two dozen trends contributing to six overarching themes along with their potential impacts. The group, with the assistance of the RAND Corporation, BJA, and the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, has identified more than a dozen ways ahead in response and sponsored initiatives in direct support of four of these ways ahead. Key Findings A Lack of Business Cases, Implementation Processes, and Security, Privacy, and Civil Rights Knowledge Hamper IT Opportunities Few know how to use and acquire many of the new technologies efficiently and effectively. Few know about the security, privacy, and civil rights protections needed to employ them safely. Business Cases and Processes for Technologies Are Lacking Business processes for operationalizing new technologies are lacking. Big Data and Analytics Are Emerging The emergence of analytics, big data, and situational awareness displays, devices, and data streams offers substantial opportunities, barriers, and risks for the criminal justice community. Security, Privacy, and Civil Rights See Challenges from New Technologies Cybersecurity protections and investigations are increasingly needed. Emerging surveillance technologies require new legal foundations. Increasing commercial pressures on unbreakable encryption might be hampering criminal investigations. The Field Needs to Get to Criminal Justice Community-Wide Integration Information must be integrated and shared, and digital evidence must be managed on a massive scale, if the field is to systematically benefit from new technologies. Safety and Community Relations Need Research and Development to Improve Agencies are facing pressures to adopt community-based models of law enforcement while pressure also mounts to crack down on violence and terrorism. Accountability, body-worn cameras, and improved less-lethal weapons are needed. New Technologies Bring New Challenges Implementing new technology, such as touch and rapid DNA and remote weapon detection, could have serious and unintended consequences but also major and unanticipated benefits. Recommendations Develop common business cases and process templates for operationalizing new technologies. Conduct research to improve how criminal justice technology information is made available to both practitioners and researchers. Integrate security, privacy, and civil rights protections into the common business processes for adapting new technologies. Educate the public on how criminal justice technologies work or (do not work) in the real world. Collect data on the going-dark problem of investigators being unable to access devices with strong encryption. Research how to change organizational cultures to support information-sharing and safeguarding. Develop regional and shared-services models for information-sharing capabilities. Identify practices and technologies that can both reduce crime and improve community relations. Explore exchanges with international partners on how to use cameras for investigative and accountability purposes. Develop new immobilization and restraint devices to provide alternatives to lethal uses of force. Assess the potential of remote weapon-detection capabilities. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 31, 2018 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1987.html Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1987.html Shelf Number: 150419 Keywords: ComputersCriminal Justice TechnologyInformation SharingInformation TechnologyLaw Enforcement Technology |
Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Report to Congress Summary: Pursuant to the requirements of Section 707 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 1998, as amended by Section 301 of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-469, ONDCP is providing Congress with this report on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). In order to present a national overview and individual HIDTA focus, this report provides background information and addresses three Congressional reporting requirements in one cohesive and coordinated document. This document is divided into an Executive Summary, Strategic Objectives, and five primary sections: 1. HIDTA Program Background Information The HIDTA program provides assistance to Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking regions of the Nation. There are currently 28 regional HIDTAs which include approximately 16 percent of all counties in the United States and 60 percent of the population. HIDTA-designated counties are located in 45 states plus Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Through the HIDTA program, representatives of Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in each HIDTA region coordinate and collaborate to address the specific drug threats of that region. 2. National HIDTA Program Evaluation This report provides Congress with an evaluation of HIDTA performance. ONDCP has established two goals for the HIDTA program which address program effectiveness, program efficiency, and program management. These goals also reflect the continued refinement of the process ONDCP has developed to manage and measure HIDTA performance. The first goal is to reduce drug availability by assisting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies participating in HIDTAs to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations. The second goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. In order to report on their achievement of these goals, each HIDTA is required to provide the following four documents pertaining to its geographical area, on which its performance evaluation is based: 1) Threat Assessment; 2) Strategy; 3) Initiative Budget Proposals; and 4) Annual Report. 3. Assessment of Law Enforcement Intelligence Sharing in the HIDTA Program This report outlines the formal processes of the HIDTA program to assess law enforcement intelligence and information sharing, and highlights the formal evaluation and review process of the HIDTA program, including policy and budget guidance; FY 2009 funding levels for intelligence; processes for sharing Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement information; and the measures needed to achieve effective sharing of information. The HIDTA program has 57 operational intelligence and information sharing initiatives. Each HIDTA capitalizes on the combined resources of the Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement communities. The HIDTAs prepare and review threat assessments and apply the appropriate law enforcement response to combat illegal drug activity in our Nation. 4. Assessment of Drug Enforcement Task Forces in HIDTAs Regardless of the method of funding task forces (e.g., HIDTA, Justice Action Grant (JAG)/Byrne-sponsored), the 28 HIDTAs provide a coordination umbrella for Federal, state, local, and tribal drug law enforcement efforts; foster a strategy-driven systemic approach to integrate and synchronize efforts; facilitate efficiency, effectiveness, and cooperation among and between various agencies; and focus on outcomes and impacts. Using both formal and informal methods of coordination among drug enforcement task forces, the HIDTAs act as neutral centers to manage, deconflict, analyze, and report on drug enforcement activities in their respective regions. 5. Individual HIDTA Reports To address the specific reporting requirements, an analysis of each HIDTA is included in this report. These reports are succinct descriptions of the individual HIDTAs and their responses to the Congressional report requirements. For more comprehensive information on an individual HIDTA's performance in addressing specific drug threats, ONDCP can provide, upon request, that HIDTA's Annual Report, Strategy, or Threat Assessment. Details: Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2010. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2018 at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 150507 Keywords: CollaborationDrug Control PolicyDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingIllegal DrugsInformation Sharing |
Author: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Title: Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit: Towards a principled and trust-based partnership Summary: Brexit poses major challenges for future interaction between the EU and the UK in the areas of criminal justice and police cooperation. A new legal framework will be required to sustain the EU's relations with the UK - an active participant in numerous EU criminal justice and police cooperation instruments - once it leaves the Union. The negotiations on the exit of the UK from the EU must grapple with the crucial question of how and to what extent can the two parties continue to maintain effective arrangements for fighting cross-border crime, while at the same time guaranteeing compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights. This report is the result of intensive deliberations among members of a Task Force set up jointly by CEPS and the School of Law at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL), who met regularly throughout the first half of 2018. It examines the feasibility of retaining the current EU-UK framework for cooperation in these critical fields and explores possible alternatives to the status quo. It also delves into the conditions under which the UK could continue to participate in EU instruments and relevant EU agencies engaged in cooperation in criminal matters and to have access to justice and home affairs databases and other information-sharing tools. In their conclusions, the members offer a set of specific policy options for the EU and the UK to consider after Brexit with a view to developing an effective partnership in the areas of criminal justice and security based on trust and shared values. Details: Brussels: CEPS, 2018. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 4, 2018 at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit.pdf Shelf Number: 151339 Keywords: BrexitInformation SharingPartnershipsPolice CooperationPolice PartnershipsSecurity Cooperation |
Author: van der Veer, Renske Title: Fusion Centres in Six European Countries: Emergence, Roles and Challenges Summary: Fusion centres are organisations tasked with interagency coordination in the field of preventing and countering terrorism. As such, most fusion centres are responsible for coordinating, analysing, combining, and facilitating information sharing with regard to terrorism, and in some cases in relation to broader security threats. Fusion centres' roles, legal mandates and their institutional make-up vary greatly across countries. The role and function of national fusion centres in Europe is an understudied topic as little comprehensive or comparative research exists on it as of yet, with the existing literature predominantly focussing on fusion centres in the United States (US). While the term fusion centre is preferred in the US, in Europe they are more commonly referred to as national counter-terrorism coordinators. Fusion centres are currently operating for over a decade, giving reason for a closer look at what purposes these centres serve in the wider security and counter-terrorism landscape in their respective countries, and what challenges they face. This report aims to address this gap and is the result of a project by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT) supported by the Dutch National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security (NCTV). It describes fusion centres in six European countries by looking at why and how they have been established and implemented in various countries. It explores why these fusion centres were created, and how their formal roles and actual activities relate to operational realities. The report utilises a literature study as well as contributions from terrorism experts on fusion centres in their respective countries, who responded to a call for contributions issued by ICCT among members of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (EENeT). The response to this call determined which European countries and fusion centres are featured in this report, namely: Belgium (CUTA), Germany (GTAZ and GETZ), Italy (CASA), The Netherlands (NCTV), Spain (CITCO), and the United Kingdom (JTAC). Additionally, this report and particularly the reflections on themes and challenges builds upon discussions by representatives of fusion centres and terrorism experts, during an expert session co-organised by ICCT between members of EENeT and the Madrid Group in October 2018. The Madrid Group is a forum under which representatives from various national fusion centres informally convene bi-annually, to share insights and experiences on threat assessments and counter-terrorism coordination. These expert discussions determined the themes that this report takes a closer look at, and fuelled the critical reflections on fusion centres' challenges in this report. Following this introduction, the second section of this report describes the emergence of fusion centres, the third section covers fusion centres in six European countries, focusing on their origins, objectives, and how they are institutionally embedded. On the basis of these descriptions and discussions with experts, the fourth section takes a closer look at two themes identified in the expert meeting, namely the development of the role of fusion centres and the collection and sharing of information. Section five then reflects on the identified challenges, focussing on 'the illusion of independence', political influence and the concept of 'human fusion'. The report ends with a general conclusion. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 7, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ICCT-VanderVeer-Bos-VanderHeide-Fusion-Centres-in-Six-European-Countries.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ICCT-VanderVeer-Bos-VanderHeide-Fusion-Centres-in-Six-European-Countries.pdf Shelf Number: 155675 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Fusion Centers Information SharingInteragency Coordination Partnerships Terrorism Threat Assessments |